TAKING PRIVATE ORDERING SERIOUSLY
AVERY KATZt
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the rules and practices of private groups have
attracted substantial attention within the field of law and economics.
In applications ranging from Robert Ellickson's seminal work on
rancher/farmer relations in Shasta County, California,1 to Lisa
Bernstein's investigation of extralegal contractual relations among
wholesale diamond traders,2 to Robert Cooter's study of aboriginal
customs in Papua New Guinea,- to Robert Scott and Alan
Schwartz's analysis of the rulemaking procedures of the American
Law Institute, 4 an increasing number of legal and economic
scholars have shown how private systems of rules work to regulate
economic relations among the communities that adopt them. While
much of this literature has been devoted to description-explaining
how such rules arise, how they operate in practice, and what
incentives they provide to group members-a significant portion of
the discussion is explicitly normative, focusing on how well private
rules perform according to the criteria typically used to assess
publicly promulgated regulations. For economists and economically
influenced lawyers, this typically means focusing on economic
efficiency;5 and within this focus, two questions have been most
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143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).

' A defense of the efficiency norm is beyond the scope of this comment. For a
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prominent. First, are the rules established by private groups likely
to be efficient, either on an absolute scale or compared to regulations promulgated by the state? Second, and relatedly, to what
extent should the state defer to existing private rules when making
law?
The symposium Articles by Robert Cooter and Eric Posner are
both important contributions to this overall discussion.' Cooter
presents himself as a tribune of legal decentralization, likening
public lawmaking to central economic planning, and private group
norms to the market.' He argues that the same reasons that have
led most contemporary economists to reject central planning in
favor of market allocation-informational and incentive problemsshould similarly lead lawyers to be skeptical of state-imposed legal
rules and sympathetic to the customary norms of private business
communities.' Specifically, he concludes that lawyers should defer
to norms that arise from an efficient incentive structure; that is,
those norms that result from open competition among alternatives
and do not impose costs on nonmembers of the community.9 For
example, norms of price-fixing among cartel participants or of
racial discrimination among a favored majority do not arise out of
an efficient incentive structure and should not receive any public
deference; but customary limitations on damages for breach of
warranty, recognized by experienced merchants who deal with each
other regularly, do and should."
Posner, in contrast, is more skeptical of the claim that private
group norms are efficient; and his Article develops a catalog of
reasons why they might not be. Among these are externalities,
strategic behavior, informational asymmetries, human emotions
such as envy, jealousy, and spite (which can themselves be conceived
of as externalities of a sort), and the traditional and widespread
appeal of competing moral values such as distributional equity or

Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
' See Robert D. Cooter, DecentralizedLaw for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996); Eric
A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697 (1996).
' See Cooter, supra note 6, at 1645-46.
8 See id. at 1657-77.
9 See id. at 1694-96.
o See id. at 1677-81; cf. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c) (1991) ("[A]n implied warranty can
also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.").
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deontological justice." He concludes that state institutions such
as courts and legislatures may well be able to improve on community norms, if they can overcome the informational and incentive
12
problems that Cooter identifies.
These two Articles complement each other in that they nicely
bracket the current theoretical debate over the efficiency of private
group norms. While Cooter is skeptical of centralized state
lawmaking, Posner is just as wary of private custom and tradition.
While Cooter argues that public regulators should limit their
scrutiny of private group norms to the question of whether such
norms arose from an efficient structure, Posner suggests it may be
possible for the state to evaluate such norms on their individual
merits. But both authors agree that the comparison between public
and private lawmaking depends on questions of incentives,
information, and externalities, that neither public nor private
institutions are fully efficient in all circumstances, and that choosing
between the two kinds of institutions is thus ultimately a problem
of the second-best. Cooter and Posner may differ in tone or
disagree about where the burden of persuasion should be placed,
but they agree in their basic thesis-that the proper role for state
lawmaking is to correct for failures in what we might call the
"market for norms."
I have no disagreement with this thesis, and in Part II below I
make a number of specific comments about the sorts of market
failures that might occur in norm-creating communities. But I do
want to critique the overall debate in which both authors are
engaged, because I think it has overemphasized a single aspect of
private ordering at the expense of other, perhaps more fruitful,
ones. The question dividing Cooter and Posner-as well as several
other contributors to this Symposium-is primarily one of jurisdiction, not substance. It asks which institution-court, legislature,
or community-is best able to set norms, not what those norms
should be. While the question of jurisdiction is important, it is not
the only one worth asking, and it may not be the best way to go
about thinking about private ordering at all. Accordingly, I want to
raise the possibility that too much intellectual effort in law and
economics has been devoted to issues of comparative institutional
11See Posner, supra note 6, at 1711-25.
12 See

id. at 1725-36.
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competence, and that not enough has gone into the substantive
solution of particular problems.
Before I make this argument, however, let me first engage
Cooter and Posner on their specific claims. In the next Part of this
Comment, I briefly sketch my own reactions to the general question
of whether and when private community norms are efficient. The
remainder of my remarks will then attempt to place this inquiry into
perspective. As I will argue, Cooter and Posner are debating a
familiar question, one that traditionally has been the central
concern of welfare economics:
whether state regulation can
improve on private ordering. In the field of law and economics,
this question is generally recognized as having been definitively
framed by Ronald Coase, who taught us that the answers all depend
on a comparison of the relevant transaction costs.13 Yet here we
are, thirty-six years after the Coase Theorem, still arguing over the
merits of private ordering. The debate has a certain irony about it,
because even as the participants emphasize the importance of
private ordering, they remain predominantly oriented toward issues
of public-law reform. Even those who, like Cooter, argue for more
deference to private ordering, address their arguments primarily to
14
public policymakers.
It seems to me that neither side of this debate really takes
seriously the idea of private ordering. Doing so, I submit, would
mean a more fundamental reallocation of our intellectual resources,
a commitment beyond simply telling the state to leave private
individuals and groups alone. Rather, it would mean that academic
lawyers and economists would spend less time offering advice to the
state and more time thinking about how to address the needs and
interests of private actors.
In the later Parts of this Comment, I explore some of the
reasons why such an intellectual shift has not yet taken place. My
conclusion, perhaps appropriately enough, is that the primary
explanation lies in the norms of our own community-the legal
academy.

" See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
See Cooter, supra note 6, at 1673-75.
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I. PRIVATE NORMS, EFFICIENCY, AND COMMUNITY FAILURE
To begin with, I think that Eric Posner is plainly right that
private groups and communities are subject to the same kinds of
qualitative failures as are market and governmental institutions, and
that there is little theoretical reason to presume that private
community norms will tend toward complete efficiency.15 Indeed,
I would go further, and argue that community norms usually will
not be fully efficient, because the very notion of a norm entails
certain departures from the classic economic model of perfect
competition. In this regard, I would stress the following "community failures," in addition to those that Posner identifies.
A. The Public-Goods Nature of Norms and Rules
Norms and rules, whether publicly or privately created, embody
and convey information. They cannot be followed unless information is transmitted regarding their substantive content; they cannot
be enforced unless information is transmitted regarding who has
obeyed them, who has violated them, and who is to impose any
associated punishment or reward. But information is a classic
public good, nonrival and to a large extent nonexcludable. Once
created, it is both costless to provide to the marginal consumer and
costly to withhold from those who have not contributed toward its
production. Complete efficiency, accordingly, demands that it be
freely distributed to all who value it, but such a policy makes it
difficult for those who produce information to cover their investment costs. As we know from the economics of intellectual
property, some system of property rights in information is necessary
to achieve even a second-best outcome. 6 But there are no property rights in customary social norms; those who develop and
maintain custom do not generally try to prevent others from
following the prescribed rules of good behavior or to collect
royalties from those who follow them. Even if the village gossips
wanted to charge for their services, it is doubtful that they could.
Thus, there is little reason to expect the amount or content of
private rulemaking to be optimal-just as the absence of any
"See Posner, supra note 6, at 1724-25.
"See generally Stanley M. Besen & LeoJ. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property,5J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1991) (describing some of the
"basic economic tradeoffs involved in intellectual property law").
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property rights in judicially promulgated rules means that the stock
of judicial precedent may be inefficiently underdeveloped' 7
B. Network Externalities

As Cooter points out, the optimal content and scope of a social
norm generally depends on how many people are already following
the norms and what other competing norms are available."8
Because most social norms entail some amount of coordination,
they become more valuable as more people use them. Each person
who decides whether to follow a norm, therefore, imposes a positive
externality on all who use it,just as each person who buys a copy of
Windows 95 and learns how to operate it increases the market for
complementary products (to the benefit of Microsoft and its existing
base of customers and to the detriment of producers and consumers
of rival operating systems). Some norms, such as traffic laws, may
become valuable only if they can attain the allegiance of a majority
of the population. Thus, even if a newly invented norm would be
more efficient than the status quo, there may be no way for a
decentralized community to coordinate its implementation. As a
result, the incentives for innovation may be substantially inadequate,
and the path of development of social norms may depend on
historical accident. 19
C. Adverse Selection and Signaling

As Cooter also observes, an important feature of social norms
is their tendency to be internalized by group members. 20 As a
result, an individual's willingness to deviate from the norm depends
upon how well he has been socialized into the community-in
economic terms, upon the cost he attaches to the disapproval of
others and the value he attaches to conformity. Because such
" See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271-75 (1976).
18See Cooter, supra note 6, at 1661-64.
'9 See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75:2 AM. ECON. REV.
332 (1985) (suggesting that such network externalities led to a suboptimal standard
for typewriter keyboards); CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CAL. L. REv. 261,320-22 (1985) (concluding that incentives for innovation in private
contract terms are generally inadequate); Michael Klausner, Corporations,Corporate
Law, andNetworks of Contracts,81 VA. L. REV. 757,772-89, 822-25 (1995) (arguing that
network externalities impede optimal development of terms in corporate charters).
o See Cooter, supra note 6, at 1661-66.
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factors are largely subjective and vary among members and
subgroups of the community, those who wish to rely on basic social
norms such as honesty and courtesy face a problem: it is difficult
to tell the extent to which one's acquaintances share those norms.
While the costs and benefits of conformity differ from norm to
norm and from individual to individual, however, there are enough
common components to socialization that a person who fails to
conform to one norm (for example, by dressing unconventionally
for ajob interview) may signal that he is more likely than otherwise
to deviate from others (for example, promptness). For this reason,
a proposal to alter a standard form lease to allow for the installation
of fixtures, or to accept a lower wage in exchange for being allowed
to show up late for work once a week, will often be met with
suspicion. As a result, people will have an incentive to conform to
norms they do not respect in order to signal their allegiance to
those they do. Thus, there will be inefficiently excessive pressure
toward conformity as well as inadequate incentives for innova21
tion.
D. Government Responses to "Community Failure"
The observation that private group norms suffer from the
foregoing deficiencies, of course, does not by itself provide
sufficient reason to conclude that government intervention can
improve matters, since state-set norms are obviously subject to
similar limitations. For example, private investments in research
and development, guided by the profit motive, may be better able
than state-funded projects to discover and distribute information
that consumers and producers will actually value. Government
"industrial policy," even if motivated by the efficiency criterion and
designed with the goal of internalizing network externalities, may
instead lead to redistribution toward politically powerful interest
groups. And private incentives to signal one's conformity may
create strong pressure to comply with state-imposed norms as well
as with communal ones-as public controversies over school prayer
and the Pledge of Allegiance amply illustrate. But again, these are
21 Cf Walter Kamiat, Labor andLemons: EfficientNorms in the InternalLaborMarket

and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting,144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1957-62
(1996) (explaining why concern for signalling propensity for deviance will prevent

individual workers from bargaining for just cause protection against employer
discharge even when such a term is more efficient than the traditional at-will
arrangement).
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questions of the second-best, and there is every reason to think that
at least some state action will be part of the optimal second-best
policy mix.
My own position on the appropriate balance between state
regulation and private norms is a strictly pragmatic one: if public
policymakers have good reason to think that a given private norm
is efficient, based on their own independent analysis, they should
defer to it, and if they have good reason to think it inefficient, they
should not defer. 22 In the absence of good information one way or
the other, my view would be that the state should not act at all, both
out of respect for individual liberty and on the general principle of
"first, do no harm."
Similarly, once public lawmakers decide to provide their own
norms, they should provide them as default rules rather than
mandatory ones, absent some good reason to the contrary.
Allowing people to opt out of the state-provided default rule, other
things being equal, is efficient; it preserves private incentives to
acquire information about norms and to put that information to its
best use. In the context of such an inquiry, I agree with Cooter that
the fact that a norm arises out of a presumptively efficient incentive
structure, such as a competitive market with no externalities, should
count as a reason to think it efficient." But like Posner, I do not
see why this reason should carry dispositive weight compared to the
24
results of an independent and professional cost-benefit analysis.
The foregoing rules of thumb, however, merely constitute a
common-sense practical guide to lawmaking; each one applies to
private policymakers as well as public ones. Every lawmaker, public
or private, should make decisions based on all the information
available at reasonable cost. In the absence of good reasons to the
contrary, every lawmaker should leave as much flexibility as possible
to later, more decentralized, or more informed actors. The federal

government should not unnecessarily restrict lawmaking by the
states; private trade associations should not unnecessarily restrict

the terms of agreements entered into by their individual members;
' I am assuming here that efficiency is the only criterion under consideration; my
position would be analogous if assessing other criteria such as equity or corrective
justice. Whether deferring to private norms means enforcing them as public law or
deferring to private actors to do the enforcement is a separate issue discussed by Lisa
Bernstein. See Lisa Bernstein, MerchantLaw in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996).
s See Cooter, supra note 6, at 1668-75.
24 See Posner, supra note 6, at 1701.
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and individual actors should not bind their own future selves by
entering into inflexible contract terms when there is no good reason
to do so.
The reasons to restrict the flexibility of subsequent or subordinate actors, furthermore, are the same at all levels of decisionmaking. All lawmakers, public and private, need to take into account
the problems of externalities, nonrival costs and benefits, strategic
behavior, and informational asymmetry. Private lawmakers, accordingly, need good economic advice on such topics no less than public
ones do.
II. WHERE HAVE WE HEARD THIS BEFORE?
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND THE COASE THEOREM

It is important to recognize that the debate in which Cooter and
Posner are engaged, along with several other participants in this
Symposium, is a variation on the basic framework of transaction-cost economics. Within this framework, the central question
is: Which governance mechanism best coordinates the disparate
plans and interests of the various individuals making up society?
This has also been the classic question in welfare economics since
Adam Smith's famous argument that the market would lead, as an
invisible hand, to the optimal allocation of all resources to their
25
highest and best use.
Smith's argument for laissez-faire began to come under attack
in the nineteenth century with the development of economic
theories of natural monopoly, oligopoly, and the regulation of
public utilities. 26 In the twentieth century, this critique was
expanded by Pigou and others into what contemporary economists
call the theory of market failure.2
According to this theory,
Smith's invisible hand argument depends on a number of special
assumptions about markets that do not hold in practice. For
See ADAM SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH

OF NATIONS
577 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776).
26

See James W. Friedman, Duopoly, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DIGTIONARY OF

ECONOMICS 939 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); William W. Sharkey, Natural
Monopoly, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra, at 603.
2 See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932) (discussing
the theory of market failure); Kenneth Arrow, The Organizationof Economic Activity:
Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIc
EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59 (Robert Haveman & Julius Margolis eds.,

1977) (discussing various types of market failure); Francis Bator, The Anatomy of
Market Failure,72 Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958) (same).
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example, if market participants act strategically to influence the
terms of exchange, or if market exchange is characterized by
externalities, scale economies, or asymmetric information, then
there is no longer any guarantee that the outcome will be efficient.
In such circumstances, government intervention can improve
resource allocation, especially if the intervention takes the form of
reforming market exchange to make it more closely resemble the
classic competitive model-for example, by breaking up monopoly
cartels through antitrust law or by internalizing externalities through
28
the imposition of an excise tax.
Coase's criticism of the Pigouvian theory of market failure,
which won him the Nobel Prize in Economics and the allegiance of
a generation of scholars, was that the Pigouvians had only told half
the story. Actual private markets fall short of the ideal of perfect
competition, it is true, but so does state allocation. Because both
markets and state institutions suffer from transaction costs, the
choice among them is an exercise in the second-best: In which
institutional setting are transaction costs less? Coase allowed that
this was an empirical question, but he is usually read to have
suspected, as Cooter does in his contribution here, that on the
whole such costs are less in private institutions than public ones.
The Coasian theory of transaction costs can be, and has been,
applied to various problems in institutional choice. Indeed, Coase,
in his 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm, originally developed it to
explain the existence of the ordinary business firm, which in his
2
view exists in order to conserve on the costs of using the market.
The 1960 article that made him famous among lawyers applied the
same idea to the question of government regulation, focusing
specifically on common-law nuisances."0 The literature that we are
discussing in this current Symposium adds a fourth institutional
possibility to the mix: relying on private groups and communities
to establish norms and to allocate resources. Such groups are
structurally different from markets, business firms, and governmental agencies; they face different constraints and use different
procedures for making rules. Thus, they will have different
28

See generally Picou, supra note 27, at 331 (noting that certain industries may be
most efficiently managed through public intervention); Bator, supra note 27.
2 Such market transaction costs include the costs of discovering relevant prices,
of negotiating and writing individual contracts under conditions of uncertainty, and
the like. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-98 (1937).

" See generally Coase, supra note 13.
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transaction costs and will be better suited to solving certain sorts of
allocation problems and worse suited to solving others. But this is
the same problem that Coase analyzed, and he has already sketched
out the framework in which to solve it.31

Thus, much of the recent discussion of private group norms in
the economic analysis of law, ranging from Robert Ellickson's Shasta
County study

2

to the present Symposium, employs observations

and arguments analogous to those that have long been made in the
traditional debate over laissez-faire. The only difference is that
instead of arguing whether government regulators should defer to
market outcomes, we are now arguing whether they should defer to
the rules developed, either spontaneously or deliberately, by private
communities.
III. WHAT DOES IT REALLY MEAN TO BE A COASIAN?
Now one might argue that studies like those of Ellickson,
Cooter, and Posner are precisely the work we should be doing in
light of Coase's analysis-trying to identify those transaction costs
that give one institution a comparative advantage over another. But
I would argue that this is a misunderstanding: it is only a part of
the work we should be doing.
It is true that the Coase Theorem tells us to pay attention to
transaction costs and to focus on the question of how to minimize
them. It is also true that one aspect of minimizing transaction costs
is to allocate rulemaking jurisdiction to the institution best able to
" As an aside, it is worth mentioning that economists were hardly the first to
recognize the importance of transaction costs in the design of legal institutions, even
if they were the first to use the particular term. Coase's analysis resonated for lawyers

in the 1960s because the groundwork had been laid by legal process scholars of the
1950s, such as Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, who stressed comparative institutional
capacity as the justification for the separation of governmental powers. See generally

& ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 158-74 (William N. EskridgeJr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., rev. ed. 1994). In the legal process view, the legitimacy of
judicial decisionmaking flows from particular features of courts that allow them to
decide cases in a way that the citizenry can recognize as fair, such as insulation from
immediate political pressures, limitations ofstanding, mootness, and ripeness, and the
obligation to produce a written statement of reasons. See id. at 640-47. Also, general
HENRY HART

policymakingjurisdiction is properly granted to the legislature, which can best canvass
and reflect the preferences of the public; and specific implementation of policies is
reserved for the executive branch and for administrative agencies, which can better
take advantage of scale economies in the collection of information and thus in
expertise. See id. at 687-702, 844-63. In Coasian terminology, such considerations

ultimately boil down to differences in transaction costs.
" See ELLICKSON, supra note 1.
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recognize and respond to transactional problems. But that is not
the end of the inquiry. Once jurisdiction is settled, whether in
public or private institutions, the substantive work of lawmaking
remains to be done. To state the point another way: In the
thirty-six years since the Coase Theorem was formulated, too much
of the discussion relating to transaction costs has been devoted to
the question of who-who should decide, who should have jurisdiction, who is the least-cost avoider. Too little discussion has been
devoted to questions of how and what-how should jurisdiction be
exercised and what substantive arrangements best conserve
transaction costs.
This problem can be illustrated by a not-so-hypothetical
argument that might arise at a law-and-economics workshop or
conference. Someone, perhaps the speaker, raises a substantive
regulatory issue-risk allocation, the appropriate default rules for
contract formation, or the tradeoff between flexibility and opportunism in contractual planning-and proposes that it be addressed
in a particular way. The objection is then made, often in chorus,
that there is no need for us to worry about this substantive problem.
The Coase Theorem, as everyone knows, tells us that private parties
will take care of it.
Regular participants in such events will recognize both the form
and substance of the exchange; I have played both sides myself at
various times. What is interesting about this standard objection,
however, is that it assumes that we, the workshop audience in
particular and the legal academy in general, should not worry about
substantive issues faced by private actors. But this implicit
assumption gets it exactly backwards. If we in the legal academy
really took seriously the idea that private nongovernmental actors
are the best decisionmakers, then we would spend more time and
effort addressing ourselves to them. We would view private
practitioners as our primary audience, just as the doctrinal scholars
and treatise writers of previous generations did. Such a route is
surely still open to us, even for those who do not follow the
traditional doctrinal approach to legal scholarship.
More specifically, we could devote our energies to helping
private parties; we could write contracts and create organizational
forms that more efficiently allocate risk, set default rules, and
balance the need for flexibility against the threat of opportunism.
In doing so, we would be operating as what Ronald Gilson has
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called "transaction cost engineers.""3 We could help potential
litigants design and learn to use dispute-resolution devices with
better incentive properties, as Robert Gertner and Geoffrey Miller
have done in their work on settlement escrows. s4 We could study
trade association rules, not for the purpose of advising courts and
legislators whether to defer to such rules, but for the purpose of
helping other trade associations decide whether to imitate them or
instead to draft their own new forms.
More generally, we could argue within the private communities
to which we belong in favor of more efficient and effective normswriting op-ed pieces, attending neighborhood meetings, serving on
volunteer committees, and the like-the very work that in previous
generations helped make lawyers the leaders of their communities.
This will mean, however, directing our attention to the needs and
interests of private individuals and groups and figuring out how to
make our theoretical knowledge about externalities, strategic
behavior, and imperfect information games both relevant and
accessible to them. If we can do this, it will both improve the
quality of private lawmaking and help to answer the increasingly
common criticism made by practicing lawyers and traditional
scholars alike that the contemporary legal academy has lost touch
with the practical needs of actual lawyers and clients. 5
The irony in all of this is that despite its frequent citations td
the Coase Theorem and its professed support for private ordering,
the law-and-economics community is still primarily oriented toward
public-law-reform scholarship. Much of the literature centers on
transaction costs and comparative institutional choice, to be sure,
and the conventional wisdom in the field often supports policies of
deregulation and decentralization. But the focus of attention is still
on the state and on advising government policymakers. In this
" Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (explaining that a lawyer adds value to a
transaction by helping to structure it so as to maximize the total benefits to the
parties).
' See Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 87 (1995) (proposing that using a settlement escrow lessens the expected costs
of pretrial bargaining).
' See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing DisjunctionBetween Legal Educationand
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992) (criticizing contemporary legal
scholars for spending their time on interdisciplinary research removed from the needs
of the profession). See generally Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921
(1993) (including various responses by legal scholars and by practitioners to Judge
Edwards's critique and a rejoinder on his part).
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sense, even the Coasians among us have not taken to heart the real
lesson of the Coase Theorem: that private lawmaking is as important as public lawmaking, if not more so. This continued focus on
public regulation is telling, and it is worth speculating on why it
persists.
IV.

WHY EVERYONE ALWAYS TALKS ABOUT PRIVATE ORDERING
BUT No ONE EVER DOES ANYTHING ABOUT IT

What, then, might be the reasons for why scholars who profess
support for the idea of private ordering continue to address
themselves primarily to a hypothetical audience of government
policymakers? One response might be that private actors are
interested in profit, not efficiency, so that scholars interested in
efficiency have no alternative but to address themselves to the state.
Another might be that time is short and research support scarce;
addressing oneself to state actors reaches the largest possible
audience for a given amount of effort. A third might be that
although private actors might be interested in scholarly advice if
offered privately, they have little interest in published scholarship,
since once such advice becomes generally available it can be
appropriated by rivals and contractual partners, removing any
competitive advantage to its use.
None of these explanations, however, provide reasons that could
appeal to a committed Coasian, since they are all variants of the
standard Pigouvian theory of market failure. While private actors
are indeed motivated by the prospect of private gain, a Coasian
would argue that the profit motive encourages them to exploit any
potential efficiencies they can find. Similarly, while the state is
indeed a powerful and large audience, decentralized private actors
have an incentive to seek out any public information that is relevant
to their needs. If there are scale economies in the production and
transmission of economic insights, private actors can always form
collective arrangements such as private law libraries and think-tanks
to take advantage of them. And, while some economic and
managerial advice is useful only in competing with rivals, other
information is genuinely productive even when it is made generally
available, as is illustrated by the substantial market for such
publications as the Harvard Business Review and the Wall Street

Journal.
One answer defensible on Coasian grounds is the one that the
infamous Willie Sutton supposedly gave when asked why he chose
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to rob banks: that's where the money is. In our legal and political
system, it is just a matter of realpolitik to focus on government
lawmakers. They have the power to divest private parties of
lawmaking authority and need to be persuaded not to exercise that
power if private ordering is to have any scope. On this view,
advocates of private ordering address the state for the same reason
that administrative law scholars spend more time addressing the
federal government than the several states. It is also why constitutional scholars have in the thirty years since the Warren Court spent
more time addressing the Supreme Court than addressing Congress.
This supposedly pragmatic answer, however, does not stand up
under close examination. Law-and-economics scholars may well
have been justified in making deregulation a scholarly priority in the
1960s and 1970s, given the then-prevailing political winds. With the
success of the deregulation movement in the last twenty years,
however, continuing to emphasize public regulatory issues in the
1990s-at the overwhelming expense of ignoring private orderingbetrays a serious lack of proportion. There is plenty of leeway for
private lawmaking in our legal system and in those of other Western
democracies, especially in the areas of commercial and contract law.
While there are still some minor restrictions burdening what private
actors can do, we basically have a capitalist economy and polity, and
that is not going to change any time soon. In the meantime, private
actors need substantive economic advice in order to make good use
of the substantial authority already allocated to them. Furthermore,
to the extent that freedom of contract still needs to be championed
in public debate, its defenders will be more effective, as well as less
likely to avoid excess, if they can show that it is currently being
exercised wisely.
Another possible justification for focusing on public-law reform
is that private actors do not need theoretical advice when they are
operating in a competitive market. Even if they act randomly, this
argument goes, the process of natural selection means their norms
will approach efficiency over time, as those who behave most
efficiently drive their rivals out of business.3 6 Even if one puts
aside the objection that natural selection will more quickly approach
an efficient equilibrium when agents act with foresight, however,
this evolutionary argument still depends on the existence of perfect
' SeePosner,supra note 6, at 1707-10,1723-24 (discussing evolutionary rationales
for the efficiency of private ordering).
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competition. In order for natural selection to yield efficient results,
there must be no externalities, strategic behavior, or scale economies. As Part I of this Comment noted, however, social norms
inherently imply the presence of both network externalities and
public goods. Such an observation is hardly fatal to the Coasian
perspective, since the Coase Theorem does not assume perfect
competition and does not claim that planning and coordination are
unnecessary. What it claims, rather, is that private actors can
engage in such planning as easily as public ones.
An alternative strategy might be to avoid and confess-to
acknowledge that there is plenty of private-sector demand for legal
and economic advice, just not for academic advice. This situation
might be due to the fact that our work is too far removed from the
practical world to be of any use to private lawmakers (in which case
it is unclear why government actors should listen to us either) or,
less immodestly, because the institutional features of the academy
give us a comparative advantage at advising the public sector when
doing academic scholarship. If such a comparative advantage exists,
then it is reasonable for us to specialize in public-law-reform
scholarship while leaving the problems of private ordering to the
practicing bar.
This last argument is a more difficult one to dismiss out of
hand. A comparative advantage in public-law scholarship might
arise either out of accumulated experience or out of the fact that
academic researchers face relatively low costs in acquiring centralized information of the sort necessary to advise government, but
relatively high costs in acquiring decentralized information of the
sort necessary to advise private parties.
Such decentralized
information is available only from private clients; it is acquired only
in the course of providing individualized professional legal services,
and its sensitivity prevents its open publication in traditional
scholarly channels.
Still, I think that an argument founded in comparative advantage
cannotjustify the academy's overwhelming focus on advising public
lawmakers. The fact that we have been accustomed to using
centralized information does not mean we cannot learn how to use
information now held in private hands; scholars of business
administration and those in other fields of economics have done so.
Any sensible assessment of comparative institutional transaction
costs, of the sort we will have to engage in to answer the questions
that Cooter and Posner raise, is going to turn on detailed factual
inquiry. I see no a priori reason for one category of detailed facts
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to be systematically harder to obtain than the other. Furthermore,
the comparative-advantage argument assumes that advising private
actors and advising the state are mutually exclusive alternatives
rather than complementary activities. If experience in advising
private actors increases our competence in advising the state-which
would seem plausible if our advice to the state centers on comparative transaction costs and regulatory issues-then sectoral specialization is inefficient, not efficient. Moreover, our classrooms are filled
with law students who are going to graduate and then specialize in
advising private actors engaged in private ordering. Shouldn't we
care about teaching these students to be competent counselors?
Finally, we might defend our scholarly priorities as follows: We
in the legal academy do sometimes address the needs of private
actors as private consultants, but because this research is done for
proprietary purposes, it is never published. Our public scholarship,
on the other hand, is not done for profit, but is pro bono work.
Governmental lawmakers and the society at large are more
deserving objects of such volunteer efforts, it might be argued, than
are private profit-seeking actors who can afford to pay for research
at the standard consultant's rate.
I do not know whether or not this last claim has any empirical
validity or whether anyone would actually make it explicitly,
although it strikes a certain familiar chord. Nonetheless, I find it
unconvincing. It is questionable whether there is any efficiency
basis for restricting access to private-law scholarship to those who
can pay. The private sector may require restrictions on publication
of research in order to motivate its production, but in the academy
we usually claim to be motivated by loftier considerations than
profit. Furthermore, it is far from obvious that public lawmakers,
or the general body of citizens they represent, are the most
appropriate beneficiaries of our public-spiritedness. The government has professional economists and lawyers on salaried staff
already and can usually find funds to pay for additional consultants
even if political constraints make other expenditures a higher
priority. In contrast, there are many deserving private parties and
groups who have difficulty affording good economic and legal
advice. If it is true that private ordering better suits their needs
than public regulation would, then it is pro bono publico to provide
them the necessary training and knowledge to make use of it. It is
not as if governmental actors take the free advice offered by
academics in their scholarly writings with any great frequency
anyway.
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CONCLUSION: ON THE NORMS OF THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
In the end, while my conclusion is based only on introspection
and my own social observations, I think the main reason law
professors continue to focus on addressing public lawmakers has to
do with community norms-that is, with the norms of the legal
academic community to which we belong. Under our own rules of
good social behavior, we are expected to address ourselves to
matters of public import and, thus, to the state. This is the way we
display altruism, public-spiritedness, good citizenship, and allegiance
to professional and scholarly norms. It is the way we express and
reinforce our commitment to the legal and constitutional order to
which we belong: by devoting ourselves to its betterment. In sum,
it is the primary way one gets status in the legal academy, with all
the good things that accompany that status: tenure, publications in
elite lawjournals, invitations to symposia, and the like. There is just
not as much status in our community attaching to work that devotes
itself to the betterment of private lawmaking by private individuals
and private groups.
Consider a modest suggestion: perhaps this norm should
change. Perhaps we should devote less attention to the jurisdictional question of who is the best lawmaker-a question ultimately
addressed to state institutions and to the citizenry in its collective
capacity--and learn to pay more attention to addressing the
substantive concerns of private lawmakers. I am not saying that we
should stop caring about public-law reform, or that Eric Posner and
Robert Cooter should not continue their research into the comparative transaction costs of courts, legislatures, and private communities and associations. Indeed, they should, in as much specific
factual detail as they can, for the questions they debate are both
valuable and interesting. Perhaps, however, such questions do not
need to be at the top of everyone's research agenda.
In this regard, economically influenced legal scholars in search
of guidance on the subject of professional responsibility might look
to the writings of John Maynard Keynes. In Keynes's view,
economists should not aspire to be physicists, philosophers, or
technocrats: nothing so glorious as that. Instead, he proposed
something that many might regard as rather more .mundane, that
"[i]f economists could manage to get themselves thought of as
humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be
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splendidl" s1 Perhaps Keynes's proposal is not such a bad aspiration for legal economists as well. If we aspired to be like dentists,
we might be required to get our hands dirty a bit more often. Our
advice might cause some pain, as therapeutic treatment sometimes
does, but all for the greater good of the patient.
So I conclude by trying .to practice a bit of what I preach: by
trying to influence the norms of my community in a possibly more
efficient direction. In sum, I have suggested that there has been a
misallocation of intellectual resources in law and economics; we
have spent too much time on advising government policymakers
about the problem of comparative institutional choice and not given
enough attention to advising policymakers, public and private, about
the substantive decisions they must face. If this suggestion is
correct, then the current allocation of resources is inefficient-which
means we can do better. But this would require a change in our
current norms.
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